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Abstract—Codes have been proposed as useful tools in designing
cryptosystem that are safe against quantum computing. Despite
the large public key size, decryption failure rate and attacks
on its constructed trapdoors have been impediments to not only
to its standardization but its eventual deployment in commu-
nication. The successful attacks on its trapdoors are due to
the high probability in decoding codewords into syndromes of
low rank through combinatoric schemes such as Decoding with
Index/Information sets from Grassmannian support proposed in
literature. Decoding with Marginals/Belief propagation especially
with Raptor codes has not been exploited fully in post quantum
cryptography which this paper has done with new results. The
introduction of Grassmannian supoort during information set
decoding, leads us to explore the concatenation of bipartite
graph with Grassmannian graph into a novel concept termed
boundary measurement. Finally, we transform conditional prob-
ability function into Copula for dependency and estimation of
the marginal using iterative expectation-maximization approach
thereby limiting the probability of decryption failure in the
process.
Keywords 1. code, marginal, index, copula, cryptogra-
phy,distribution
I . INTRODUCT I ON
Classical security assumptions and trapdoors; factor-
ing large integers and discrete logarithm problems has been
shown to have solution in polynomial time[1] which poses
serious security challenges for future communication systems.
Code based cryptography which relies on hardness of decoding
syndromes as its security metric has proven to be one of
the encryption mechanisms resilient to quantum attacks. The
first real effort to formalize code based cryptography was the
technique by McEliece[2] which employed binary Goppa codes
with trapdoor based on the hardness of decoding a linear code
and the difficulty in differentiating Goppa ccodes from other
random codes. Cryptosystems have also been designed that
employ the Hamming metric, which specifies the number of
vector coordinates that distinguishes one vector from another
termed as the hamming distance. The rank metric specifies
matrices over a finite field which bequeath a large rank to
non-zero matrices. Research into applying some other family
codes like the Quasi-cyclic codes [3], Low density parity check
codes [4] and a concatenation of both to solve this problem
of storage of the public keys have been pursued vigorously.
The weight of the rows and advent of structural attacks have
made them impractical for use[5] . The approach of using Rank
Parity check codes was to mitigate against structural attacks
which stems from the algebraic nature of codes. For a small
key size and appropriate choice of parameters an equivalent of
280 bits of security can be achieved. Gabidulin introduced the
rank metric and the Gabidulin codes over finite field with qm
elements, Fqm and construct the first rank-based cryptosystem
(GPT) with much smaller key size compared to McEliece on
Goppa codes. The decoding algorithm in explanatory tense
states for a parity check matrix H , an input of an error vector
e to decode a syndrome of low hamming weight such that
HeT = sT . A digital signature generation algorithm whose
security is dependent on decoding codes with rank metric called
RankSign [6] have also been developed. An encryption scheme
using Gabidulin codes based on the security assumption of
the hardness of the Rank syndrome decoding problem and
Decisional Rank Syndrome decoding problem was developed
with the scheme achieving 2140 bits of security at a smaller
public key.They also studied the Low Rank Parity Check codes
and proposed a probabilistic decoding algorithm. They reported
that their cryptosystem has small public key size than what
is an obtainable using MPDC code. size[7]. The effect of
algebraic attacks on the parameters for a RankSign algorithm
in polynomial times and its vulnerability due to the fact that
the Augumented LRPC codes have low Hamming weight. The
algebraic attacks tend to expose the trapdoor function employed
in constructing the cryptosystem. They also explored matrices
with low weight code words whose security relied on the Rank
support Learning problem were employed in the design [8].
A revocable Indentity Based Encryption from codes with rank
metric whose selective security proof is in the random oracle
model was constructed and its security relies on the hardness of
solving the Rank Syndrome Decoding (RSD) problem, Rank
Support Learning (RSL) problem and the Augmented Low
Rank Parity Check Code (LRPC+) problem. The RankSign
Algorithm was employed to generate the trapdoor function
and the binary tree for key updates with the complexity
of the key updates increasing logarithmically [9]. The first
rank based IBE cryptosystem with security based on the
Rank Syndrome Decoding Problem, Augmented Low Rank
Parity Check Code problem and the Rank Support Learning
problem was developed. By finding low weight codewords
distinguishable from a random code the cryptosystem can be
cryptanalyzed [6] .An encryption scheme with security based
on the hardness of decoding low weight vectors of Quasi-cyclic
codes. The probability of decryption failure was analyzed and
the scheme has a degraded encryption rate [10].
In investigating the security of code based system through
combinatorics, the underlying trapdoor is transformed into
an optimization problem which can be solved iteratively. In
the case of Information set decoding, the index set without
error perturbations can solve an optimization problem that
is a function of a masking of the generator matrix while in
belief propagation, the set contains the candidtate codeword
that would estimate the marginal distribution of a likelihood
function, in the process decrypting the message. These decod-
ing techniques are useful tools for cryptanalysis and also the
complexity of its computation is a potent force in securing
data. The Message passing approach used in decoding LDPC
codes can be defined in terms of marginal distribution were
the error is sampled from while the information set approach
employed by rank metric codes can be defined in terms of set
of indices were the error is sampled from.
A. Contribution
In this paper, we employ the optimization approach were the
marginal distribution of a the likelihood function that that
defines a codeword can be estimated using maximum like-
hood estimator enhanced with a copula which to the best of
our knowledge has not been studied especially in the context
of cryptography.The introduction of copula is to enhance the
recovery of the message when taking into cognizance of the
fact that error is sampled from a random distribution. This
paper analyzes different decoding from the perspective of the
nature of the distribution where the error is sampled from
and how inference can can be carried out while we provide
some interesting result when the sum product based belief
propagation or information set approach is employed. Also
we study the concatenation of the bipartitie graph and the
grassmannian graph which are important theoretical foundation
for codes into a term called Boundary measurement which can
generate codes with interesting structure that mitigate structural
attacks. The reason for bringing the Grassmannian into this
context, is a generalization of the error support in the index
set into a Grassmannian support. Infact, there might not be
any need for permutation or invertible matrices which makes
generation of the private key and public key efficient at better
security guarantee.
I I . PREL IM I NAR I E S
A. Notation
Table I gives the notation that would be employed
in this paper
B. Rank Decoding Problem
The security of code based cryptography that
relies on the rank metric depend on the solution to the rank
syndrome decoding problem which is defined as follows
Definition 1. Can a vector (error) xi with rank weight w
an integer which represent the ith column of a perturbation
that corrupts a codeword X to X
′
be found if the expression
holds HTx = S were S ∈R Fn−kqm is a secret vector or
syndrome and H is a parity check matrix over Fqm . We
extend the definition to the low rank codeword problem as
rank(A − C) = w were A ∈ Fm×nq is a matrix and C is
a linear marix code and w is the rank weight. This leads
us to the computational syndrome decoding problem which
TABLE I
NOTAT I ON S
Symbols Meaning
q power of prime
Fq finite field of q elements
Fqm extension field of degree m
Fnq vector spaces of dimension n over Fq
A n×m matrix
a vector
Gq(n) set of subspaces belonging to Fnq
ker(A) kernel of matrix A
ω matrix multiplication complexity exponent
E Subspace code E(minimum entropy subset
of Gq(m))
F Subspace code F (minimum entropy subset
of Gq(m))
ds(E,F ) subspace distance between E and F
E ⊕ F Smallest subspace
rk(A) rank of A over Fq
〈A〉 Fq span of A
relates the negligible advantage of probablistic polynomial
time algorithm to find the perturbation error x given the
parameters (H, s, w) and defined as follows
Definition 2 (Computational Syndrome decoding problem).
The advantage of probablistic polynomial time algorithm A
to find a vector x ∈ Fqm that would satisfy HTx = s after
making adaptive queries qτ to obtain a syndrome s and
given H ∈ Fn×mq and w the rank weight is with negligible
advantage . It is very important that the probability of
an algorithm that would solve the rank syndrome decoding
problem is to be bounded 1. We also define other two security
assumptions employed in the rank syndrome problem.
Definition 3 (Decisional Rank Syndrome decoding problem).
A probabilistic polynomial time algorithm has negligible ad-
vantage to compute G a generator matrix from G ∈ F k×nqm
and x
′
from MG + x given a message bit M ∈ F kqm and
a vector x ∈ Fnqm with row weight w that is Advdrsdm,n,k =
Pr[ A(G,mG ⊕ x) = (G, x′ ] ≤  and x′ ∈ Fnqm .
From the decryption algorithm that would be constructed, we
can improve the definition of the Decisional Rank Syndrome
decoding problem as follows
Definition 4. A probabilistic polynomial time algorithm has
negligible advantage to compute H
′
from an augumented
LRPC code H
′
from a homogeneous parity check matrix
H ∈ Fn−k×nq and x
′
from MPT s
′
+ x given a message bit
M ∈ F kqm , a syndrome s
′ ∈ Fnqm a vector x ∈ Fnqm and square
invertible matrix P ∈ Fn−t×nqm that is (Pr[ A(H,MPT s
′
+
x) = (H
′
, x
′
)] ≤ 
We give the definition of the chosen plaintext attack,
which specifies a security game between a challenger and
an adversary. The adversary makes adaptive key generation
queries and the challenger responds by running a key genera-
tion algorithm with input of a security parameter and responds
with a master public key. The adversary chooses two equal
message bits |M1| = |Mo| and sends to the challenger who
responds by running the encryption algorithm to generate
ciphertexts and choose random bits b ∈ {0, 1}. A outputs
a bit b
′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b = b′ .
C. Raptor codes
Raptor codes are generated from an LT encoder
which has been fed with a precoded LDPC symbol produced at
an infinite rate. This is called the mean-LLR-Exit chart. This
can be expressed as [11] Lcj = ελ(1−
∑d
i=2 ρΥ
(i)
E (1−L(i−1)cj ))
were ΥE(ρ) = 1 − 1n
∑n
j=1(1 − ρ)g−1ρn−g[ geˆg − (n − g +
1)eˆg−1] is the EXIT function and eˆg is the unormalized
information bits in g partitions of the binary code and ε is the
channel erasure probability. In other words for block length
k < n, a serial concatenation of ν1, . . . νk source symbol fed
to the LDPC coder with c1, . . . , cn LT output symbols. The
rate of the LDPC coder in relation to the number of source
symbols and the number of outer symbols by the expression
R = nk .If the bipartite graph with vertices V projects into
the tanner graph[12] G, then the block length is expressed as
n = |V
′ |2
4 + |V
′ | and the length of the information bits is
expressed as k = |V
′ |2
4 . The serial concatenation is modelled
using tanner graphs with edges and vertices. The degree of the
individual vertices which is sampled from an output degree
distribution Ω(x) =
∑i=1d
Ωdx
d by randomly selecting an
integerm ∈r {1, . . . d} should be less than or equal to the num-
ber of output symbols which follows that Ω(x)R→∞ = eα(x−1)
were α = Rβ is the average degree of the vertex that represents
the source symbol and β =
∑d
i=1 dΩd is the average degree
of the vertex that represent the output symbol. The edges
that connects the vertices of the intermediate symbol and the
output symbol is sampled from a distribution expressed thus
ω(x) =
∑d
i=1 ωdx
d−1 were ωd is the finite number of edges
linking the vertex that represent the output of the LT coder.
To optimize ω(x), density evolution is employed[13] . The
posteriori rate of the code design[14][13] is expressed as the
rate by which the degree of the edges are sampled from the
distribution spanning from the intermediate vertex edges to
the outer vertex defined by LT and given as Rpost = 1α∑ ωdi
and the goal of raptor code design is to minimize Rpost by
employing the edge distribution of the LT output vertex.Finally,
the individual intermediate symbols is Xored to generate the
raptor codes which are transmitted over erasure channels 1.
D. Rank Matrix code
We define the rank distance of a linear matrix
code C ∈ F were F is a subspace code over Fqm as
d = minds(X,Y ) were X,Y ∈ C are m× n matrices. For a
1BIAWGN channel modelled as yj = xj + ej were xj = (−1)−2cj
and channel estimate L(cj) = 2yjSNR were SNR = 1σ2e
and σ is the
variance of the distribution N (−1, σ2). We can extend the channel estimate
to represent the channel log likelihood ratio as follows L(cj) = log
ρcj (0/yj)
ρcj (1/yj)
were ρcj is the probability density function as a function of the channel output
symbol
Fig. 1. Non-planar bipartite structure of Raptor code construction
bijective mapping between a vector a and a matrix A ∈ Fm×nq ,
the subspace of a size n−k, the complexity of a combinatoric
attack is given by n− k)3m3q(n−k)
[
(k+1)m
n
]
−m [15]. The
bound on the rank distance is given as d ≤ n−k+1 [15] when
the number of equations is greater than or equal to the number
of variables, an instance of such a code is the Gabidulin code.
We can perform lifting on an interleaved code by transforming
the linear matrix code to a subspace by multiplying its
transpose with an identity matrix. The linear matrix code C
is a linear code generated by matrices (m× n). The size of a
linear matrix code is [ m × n, k] ∈ Fqm which translates to
a size of m × n and a dimension k. The linear matrix code
can be represented by Cj =
∑m
i=1Xijβi∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
were βi is a basis of a subspace F over Fqm . The basis of a
subspace over Fq and multiplies C by non zero element does
not affect the rank distance between codewords. The basis
can also be a row of a generator matrix G ∈ F k×nqm which has
the complexity of k(n− k)m2log2qbits [16]. We can express
the linear matrix code as a function of the parity check matrix
C ↔ XHT = 0. The subspace F over Fqm is also called
support of a codeword X which generates the subspace from
its coordinates. The dimension of the subspace determines the
rank weight of the codeword and the number of subspaces is
given by the Gaussian coefficient expressed as(
m
w
)
q
=
w−1∏
i=0
qm − qi
qw − qi (1)
w is the rank weight and qm and qi are monomials over Fqm .
the Lemma defines this concept further
Lemma 1. The support (X) = 〈F 〉Fqm is the Gaussian
support were F ∈ F r×nq and rank(F ) = r is the Grassmann
support matrix of X ∈ Fnqm with rank(X) = r.
In information set decoding, the probability of de-
coding the perturbation error given a [ n, k, t+ 1] matrix code
is given by
Pdec =
(
n− k
t
)
(
n
t
) (2)
with complexity Pdec = O(1).2nH2(t/n)−(1−k)H2(t/(n−k))
were H2(x) = −xlog2(x) − (1 − x)log2(1 − x) [17].If the
parity check matrix H is expressed with respect to (n−k)×n
identity matrix, an m × k zero matrix and (n − k − n) × k
random matrix code chosen uniformly as H = (I/0/R) then
the linear matrix code is called a simple code and to decode
such a matrix value when m < m+n−sqrt(m−n)
2+4km
2 is
given by Pf ∼ 1qm−w+1 as q →∞[Ref].
The bound on the rank metric is given by the Rank Gilbert-
Varshanov bound[6] which is defined as thus
Definition 5 (Rank Gilbert-Varshanov). The number of
elements of a sphere S given integers n,m, q, t with radius
t ∈ Fnqm is equal to the number of support with m× n bases
of dimension t. For t ≥ 1 this follows that
S =
t−1∏
j=0
(qn − qj)(qm − qj)
qt − qj (3)
For a ball of radius t, the volume of
B =
∑t
i=0 S(i).Also for a matrix code C, if B ≥ qm(n−k)
and
∑d−2
j=0(
n− 1
j
) < 2n−k then the smallest integer t is
referred to as the Rank Gilbert-Varshanov bound. We also
define the singleton bound as follows
Definition 6 (Singleton Bound). The Singleton bound is
defined as r ≤ n−k+1 when n > m then r ≤ 1+[ (n−k)mn ]
were r is the minimum rank.
I I I . PRODUCT O F SUP PORT FOR RANK CODE S
Assuming two codewords C1 and C2 have rank
weight w1 and w2. C1 and C2 have two different support F
and E were F = {F1, . . . , Fw1} and E = {E1, . . . , Ew2},
then the product of the supports is bounded by 〈FE〉 ≤ w1w2
were w1 and w2 are the dimensions of the supports
F and E. if w1w2 < m then the probability holds
Pr(dim〈FE〉 < w1w2 ≤ q
w1w2
qm . We define the following
lemmas that would be used to prove the main result.
Lemma 2 (Ref). if two bases A and B are chosen were A is
random and B is fixed, then let F = F
′
+ 〈a〉 be a support
were F
′
and E are two supports of dimension w
′
1 and w2 that
is dim〈F ′E〉 = w′1w2 and 〈a〉 ∈R Fqm then the probability
holds Pr(dim〈FE〉 < w′1w2 + w2 ≤ q
w
′
1w2+w2
qm .
It follows that if A is random and B is fixed
then the probability that a support E and A a base that
generates a random support with dimension w1 is at least
1 − w1 q
w1w2
qm were dim〈AE〉 = w1w2. According to [Ref]
there exist a perturbation x ∈ E were E is a support and
x /∈ Fq , then given dim〈AE2 = w1w2 and an error e ∈ 〈AB〉
with e /∈ A then the product xE is an element of the support E.
Proposition 1. Let A be a base that generates a fixed support
with dimension w1 and B a base that generates a random
support with a basis such that dimension w
′
2 = w
′
1(1 − w2)
if A ∪ 〈AB〉 = β then the probability 1 + w2 q
2w1w
2
2+w2(w2+1)
qm
holds.
Proof. We have ∩iβ−1i s = A then it follows that A∪〈AB〉 =
β were 〈AB〉 is the product of the support with their attendant
bases A and B which gives a new bases β. If A is random
the dimension becomes w
′
1w2−w2 = w2(w
′
1−1) this follows
that a random support with a base B has a dimension w
′
2 =
w
′
1(1 − w2) as given. If 〈AB〉 ∩ 〈AB〉−1 = A such that the
dimension of a fixed base B = dimB = dimw2 +Bβ−1 which
is equivalent to w2(w2+12 + Bβ
−1. Multiplying by 2 to both
sides it now becomes w2(w2 + 1) + 2w1w22 with the given
probability
A variant of the decisional rank syndrome decoding
problem which employs the hardness of finding a subspace U ,
a fixed support generated by a base A and a vector u sampled
from the subspace U over Fnqm is hard. This variant is called
the Rank Support learning problem. That is a probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm has negligible advantage given a
base A and Au to compute U which satisfies the expression
Pr[ A(A,Au) = U ] ≤  (4)
IV. CRYP TOGRAPHY
A. Setup
LetH
′
be a parity check matrix of Augmented LRPC
code with a parity check matrix H of weight d ≥ 4w+ 1 and
P is a square and invertible matrix with weight w2 . Given
a security parameter λ choose a Static Output Feedback gain
K : {0, 1}∗ 7→ F k+tqm . We define a generator matrix G ∈ F k×nqm
of a syndrome s which is decodable with d ≤ 2w were w is
the weight of the perturbation error x ∈ Fnq . Then a random
vector u← Fnqm is generated with rank ||u|| = n. The master
public key is T = (P, s) and public parameters; (RPT , G, u)
were R ∈ F (n−t)×tqm .
B. Key Generation
Compute the square and invertible matrix P as
P ← K(ID) were P ∈ F k+tq . Then choose u ∈R Fn+lqm
and compute a syndrome s = H
′
xT were x ∈ Fn′+tq . Finally
we compute sA = P − x which follows s′ = P−xA and then
return SKID = {s′i}.
C. Encryption
Compute the square and invertible matrix P by
P ← K(ID) with the message bit m ∈ Fn′qm − k
′
. Then
compute the ciphertext C1 = m(H
′
G + PT s
′
) + x and
C2 = C1
(
RPT
x
)
+C1
(
I
s′G
m and return CT = (C1, C2)
were R ∈ F t×nqm .
D. Decryption
(s
′ | − 1)(C2
C1
) = s
′
C2 − C1 = s
(
C1(
RPT
x
) + C1(
I
s′G
)m)− C1
= s
′
C1(
RPT
x
) + s
′
C1(
I
s′G
)m−m(H ′G+ PT s′) + x
= s
′
C1(
RPT
x
) + C1(
I
G
)m−mH ′G+MPT s′ + x
Since H
′
can be expressed as its constituent the identity
matrix and G is the generator matrix of H then it follows that
s
′
C1(
RPT
x )+mP
T s
′
+x. Since d ≤ 2w then mPT s′+x can
be solved with an efficient algorithm to recover the message.
E. Security Analysis
Theorem 1. The Advantage of a probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm to win the IND-CPA game after making adaptive qH
and qKG to the random oracle is  ≤ (qH+qKG)SDP +ffvp
were , SDP , ffvp are negligible functions.
Proof. The game is the same with the original IND-CPA
game except the adversary A makes adaptive queries to the
oracle K : {0, 1} 7→ F kq for the challenge set id∗j . A makes
adaptive query for the secret key and the challenge responds
with the parameter (P, s, u) and runs the key generation
algorithm KG(PP,msk, id) → SKID which sends SKID
to A
In the challenge phase A makes more queries on the challenge
id not queried and outputs 2 equal messages M0 and M1. If
id∗ = idi the challenger C aborts the game even though the
guess bit β is hidden from A otherwise A returns a bit c∗ and
wins if c∗ = c. The bit c is generated at the random toss of
a coin by the challenger and used to compute the ciphertext
CT which is sent to A. This game is indistinguishable from
the original game by the hardness of the syndrome decoding
problem that is
|Pr[ G1] − Pr[ G0] | ≤ SDP (qH + qKG)
After an adaptive queries by the challenger on the identity
id∗, A generates a challenger ciphertext CT ∗ = (C∗1 , C
∗
2 )
from a random matrix R.
Since x∗ is sampled from a discrete gaussian distribution, the
second game is indistinguishable from the first game by the
hardness of the finite field variable problem that is
|Pr[ G2] − Pr[ G1] | ≤ ffvp
V. D ECOD I NG W I TH INDEX S E T
A. Review
We review the algorithms that gives the complexity of
decoding the perturbation error when the index set contains the
error support E of low rank weight which has a Grassmannian
structure.
1) Hauteville-Tillich
In this algorithm, the linear matrix code C is trans-
formed to C
′′
by multiplying two n×m invertible matrices P
and Q to become C
′′
= QCP with the same rank weight w
and C
′′
=
∑l
j=1 βl were βl is a basis of the subspace and xi
has zero entities with its ith entry equals to 1. Then choosing
a random support V which is expressed as V =
∑r
j=1 Vj and
entries chosen uniformly for j.{l + 1, . . . , r} and the basis
chosen in this manner Vj = 0∀j ∈ [ 1′l] ;Vj = 0∀j ∈ [ l +
1, r] , Vi = 1∀i ∈ [ 1, l] . Then the perturbation x is expressed
as xj =
∑
j = 1rαijVj for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. The number of
variables that make up the equation becomes (m− l)(r− l) +
l(n− l)∀i ∈ {l+1, . . . ,m}, {l+1, . . . , r} and j ∈ [ 1, a] and
the dimension of C
′′
is given as km, therefore the number of
equations is equivalent to nm− km. For a solution to occur,
the number of equations (n−k)m ≥ (m−a)(r−a)+a(n−a)
which becomes r = b mm−l (n− k) + am−nm−l c and the resulting
complexity becomes O(n−k)3m3q(w−l)b mm−l (n−k)+lm−nm−l c)
[18].
2) Gaborit-Ruata-Schrek
In the first phase, the linear matrix code C with
parity check matrix H is transformed to C
′
by the expression
C
′
= C + Fqmx were C
′
contains the perturbation error x.
To generate the linear matrix code, the parity check matrix
H is computed from the solution of the rank decoding
problem HxT = sT , then the generator matrix G of the
matrix code C is used to transform it into C
′
. To find the
transformed error perturbation belonging to the transformed
matrix code we employ the integer programming problem
were the objective function |x′ |R = w is minimal such that
H
′
x
′T = 0 holds were H
′
is the parity check matrix of the
transformed code C
′
. Since the dimension of the support F
is α, then x
′
is of the form αx were α ∈ Fqm . Consequently,
employing the support trapping approach, we can find an error
codeword x such that 1 ∈ support(x) = E which follows
that 1 ∈ F = E were E is a support and F ⊃ support(x).
When we represent the error codeword as a function of a
basis it becomes xj =
∑r
j=1 αijβj were βi is a basis of the
support and αij is the column space of the error codeword
xj . Then if dimψ(F ) = dimF − 1 were ψ = VFq and V is a
random subspace. Furthermore, expressing the subsapce F as
a function of its basis becomes F =
∑n
l=1 ψlβl. Therefore
setting up the number of variables nr with m equations
results to
n∑
l=1
r∑
j=1
ψlαijH
′
lβj+, . . . ,
n∑
l=1
r∑
j=1
ψlαijH
′
n−k−lβj = 0 (5)
Since F ⊃ supp(x) then there must be one solution and for
this to hold, m > n that is m(n − k − l) ≥ nr that is r =
bm(n−k−l)n c = m − dm(k+1)n e. Since dimψ(F ) = dimF − 1
and dimψ(E) = dimE − 1 then the number of supports of
dimensions w becomes w − 1 and the number of subspace
of dimension r becomes r − 1, then we have the guassian
probability P =
w − 1
r − 1

qw − 1
m− 1

q
= q(w−1)(m−r). The complexity
of decoding x were H
′
x
′T = HαxT = s becomes O((n −
k)3m3q(w−1) (k+1)mn [15].
3) Gaborit-Rutta-Schrek Algorithm
Given a multivariate polynomial Fm(f1, . . . , fm) =∑r
i=0 fix
qi and another multivariate polynomial Fy =
(f1, . . . , fm) =
∑r
i=0 fiy
qi all of degree r, based on the
linearity principle F (αx+ βy) = αFx + βFy∀α, β ∈ Fq . if x¯
and y¯ are roots of the equation then Fx¯ = Fy¯ = 0. For a matrix
code C ∈ Fqm with generator matrix G =
∑k
i=1,j=n gij and
rank(x) = r then y = XG + x were X ∈ C is a codeword.
Given a random subspace V =
∑
j = 1rVj , X =
∑k
j=1Xj ,
then we have xj =
∑r
j=1 αijVj thus gives k + r variables of
the polynomial Fy. There exist a random subspace V ⊂ E
were Fy¯ ∈ E. Then for ∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, y = XG +
x = F (yj = F
(∑k
j=1Xjgij + xj) = 0 were F (xj) =∑r
j=0 fjx
qj
j , the unknowns are chosen in this manner; for
k + r unknowns fjx
qj
j ∀i ∈ [ 1, k] and j ∈ [ 0, r − 1] ,
for k unknowns xq
r
j ∀j ∈ [ 1, k] and for r unknowns
fj∀j ∈ [ 0, fr−1(corresponding to scalar coordinate of y).
Consequently the number of equations m ≥ (r+1)(k+1)−1,
if xj = 0, then Xj is decreased by one and then the variables
are decreased by (r + 1) terms [15].
B. Integer Programming method
We generalize the integer programming problem[19]
to the Rank syndrome decoding problem. If the perturbation
that transforms X a codeword to X
′
its corrupted variant,
we can generalize the definition of the decoding proble; to
find a vector x > 0 that minimizes or maximizes a function,
if the equations and the coefficients that arise from the
generation of a polynomial which results from the vector x
is set as constraints. In other words, the finite field variable
programming problem is to find a perturbation error x ∈ Fnq
such that the objective function 〈w, x〉 is minimized with
respect to the function H ∈ Fn×mq such that HTx = s holds.
Such a perturbation error vector x is a solution to the finite
filed variable programming problem. Assuming the syndrome
is also corrupted by an error perturbation e then we have
s = HeT were H ∈ Fn×mq a parity check matrix and e ∈ G
were G ∈ F k×mqm is a generator matrix. Then we can find X a
codeword such thatHTx = HeT which means that ifHeT = 0
then X can be found. We can also see that this satisfies the
maximal decoding problem were wt(xG+ s) ≤ w.
Lemma 3. Let E be a random support and F a subspace
were F ⊂ Fqm then for any set of support containing the
restricted positions of the perturbation error x then
supp(x) ⊂ F =
r∑
j=1
xj (6)
were supp(x) = E
Proof. The support E is equivalent to the set of coordinates of
the perturbation error which is set in the support F over Fqm .
Let xj be a solution to the problem F (yj = F (
∑k
j=1 xjgij +
xj) = 0. This is true by deduction.
We can also point out the following proposition,
let x be such that the rank(C) = r were x ∈ C,
let βj be the jth coordinate of the basis βi of
the support F ⊂ Fqm . Then the following holds
dimφ(β) = dimF−dimE = dimF−∑rj=1 βj = r. Let w1, w′2
be the dimensions of the support F and E were w1 = w−12 ,
then by linearity w1φ(w2) = w−12 (FqmE) ≤ q
m−1
q−1 .
The linear code are transformed with the augmented LRPC
code H
′
which is a function of the parity check matrix H of
the linear matrix code. We employ the finite field variable
problem were the variables are additive elements in a group
over a finite field with q elements. The error perturbation x is
decoded optimally if the objective fucntion ||x|| is minimized
were ||x|| is the Euclidean norm of the perturbation error and
||y − x′ || ≤ ∞. The objective function ||x|| is minimized
with respect to the augmented LRPC code H
′
such that
H
′
yT (modq) holds were y0 − y = modq gives a transformed
perturbation error x
′
were the supp(x
′
) ⊂ V a random
support were x − x′ = modq this means xmodq = x′ .If
xj =
∑r
j=1 αijVj∀j ∈ [ 1, n] and αij ∈ Fqm then
degFq(α(xi), . . . α(xn)(w − xi) ≤ 2r + k [theorem15
[20]], we now have (x1, . . . , V1, . . . V2r+k). For an injective
isomorphism
φ : Fmq 7→ Fnq
x 7→ γn were γn ∈ E and supp(γn) ⊂ V
then dim(φ) = dim(F )− textdim(V ) = γ− (2r+k) = k−r.
A random choice of the basis is given as follows
Vj ∈ {1, . . . , n} and Vj ∈ {n + 1, . . . , n} were∑n
i=1 αiV (yi − xi) = 0. The syndrome decoding problem
becomes
H
′
xT =
∑n
l=1
∑k
j=1 αijH
′
lVj = 0, we now have
Prob(V ⊂ F ) =
[
r − (n+ k)
w − n
]
q[
m− n
w − n
]
q
= q(w−n)(m−r) (7)
For a solution to be found r − (n + k)(w − n) + m(2r +
k) = m(n − k) which results in a complexity of O(n +
k)3m3q(w−n)
⌊(
m
k−1
)
−1
⌋
. From the injective isomorphism
φ : Fmq 7→ Fnq , employing multivariate polynomial perspective,
we extend the Support Trap approach using the lemma
Lemma 4. Let X ∈ C generated by a Generator matrix with
parity check matrix H and let h1, . . . , hn be the coordinates
of H then X =
∑n
i=1 φXjhij = Jx were Jx is a function of
x were x = xiβi, . . . xnβ and φ : Fq 7→ Fqm .
Proof. if there exist a solution xj to the multivariate
polynomial then
∑n
i=1 φF (xj) = 0 holds then we have
n∑
i=1
αiF (yj − xj) =
n∑
i=1
αi(F (yjhij)− Jx(hij)
= F (yj
n∑
i=1
φihij)− J(
n∑
i=1
φihij) = F (yj(xi)− J(xi)
= F (yj)(xi)− F (xi) + J(xi).
By linearity principle F (yj)(xi) + F (αxi + βxi). Since
F (xi) = 0 which reduces to F (αxi+βxi) = αFxi+βJxi
Inspired by [17] approach, we define a solution
to the syndrome decoding problem, HxT = sT were H is
an (k + l) × l parity check matrix generated by a matrix
G with coordinates (g1, . . . , gn) and rank weight of x
is w. We obtain the low codeword s from the error x
when x
′
is obvious. Let H = (H
′
, H
′′
) ∈ F (k+l)×l2 and
x = (x
′
, x
′′
) ∈ F (k+l)2 We define an indentity matrix Iu
and a zero matrix OV were both are restricted to n − k − l
positions, IU =
[
I l
In−k−l
]
and OU =
[
Ol
On−k−l
]
. We
transform the matrix IU and OV by multiplying by the parity
check matrix H as follows IUH =
[
H
′
I l
H
′′
In−k−l
]
and
OVH =
[
H
′
Ol
H
′′
On−k−l
]
. Furthermore, multiplying the error
vector x to both matrices were x is generated by k+ l entries
IUHx
T =
[
H
′
x
′T + x
′′T
H
′′
x
′T + x
′′T
]
and OVHxT =
[
H
′
x
′T
H
′′
x
′T
]
.
Concatenating the matrices becomes
IUOVHx
T =
[
(H
′
x
′T .H
′
x
′T ) + (H
′
x
′T .x
′′T )
(H
′′
x
′T .H
′
x
′T ) + (H
′′
x
′T .x
′′T )
]
(8)
let s = (s
′
, s
′′
) then
IUOV s
T =
[
H
′
x
′T +Ol
H
′′
x
′T s
′
+Ol
]
=
[
H
′
x
′T
H
′′
x
′T s
′
]
We can obtain x, if we solve the equation H
′
x
′T and then
solving x− x′ = modq.
V I . N EW NP FUNCT I ON S
A. Trapdoor Function
A parity check matrix for Augmented LRPC codes
[6] can replace a parity check matrix for non-augmented or
homogeneous matrix as a trapdoor function that can be used
in the rank syndrome algorithm to solve the decoding problem.
A homogeneous matrix H = (Hij)i≤j≤n ∈ Fn−k×nqm has a
weight w, if its coefficients generate a vector space Fwq were
H is a homogeneous matrix of dimension w ∈ Fn−k×nqm , R ∈
F t×nqm a random matrix and P ∈ F tqm is a square and invertible
matrix with the same number of columns as H
′
. We employ
the distinguishing lemma to describe the trapdoor function
used in the security against chosen distribution attack.
Theorem 2. Let D be the distribution (P, s, x) were P ∈ F tqm
is a square and invertible matrix, x ∈ Wr is sampled from
a Trapdoor Function such that H
′
xT = s were s ∈ F k+tqm is
a solution to the linear equation eA = P − x for an error e
that is unknown and D
′
be the distribution (P
′
, s
′
, x
′
) were
s
′ ∈ F k+tqm , x
′ ∈ Wr is sampled from a Trapdoor function
and s is a solution to the linear equation P
′
= s
′
A + x
′
,
the probabilistic polynomial time algorithm has negligble
advantage to distinguish D0 and D
′
1 with  ≤ 2q + drsd were
H
′
is an augumented LRPC matrix code of type (d, t). An
alternative approach of sampling x we would be to sample it
from a discrete gaussian distribution.
B. Static Output Feedback Design function
The Static Output Feedback Design function is to
determine if a continuous-time linear system can be controlled
by a feedback expressed as u = ky such that the system
is asymptotically stable given the parameters of the system
x˙ = Ax + Bu, y = Cx were x ∈ Fnq , u ∈ Fmq , y ∈ F pq are
state vectors, input and output and A,B,C are matrices with
constant real coefficients and dimensions.
The asymptotical stability denotes the fact that A+BkC has
all its eigen vectors with negative real part and if the output
is controllable then the gain k is a solution. if the matrix C
defines a one way function then sufficient conditions are dif-
ficult to determine[Ref]. Assuming the matrices A,B,C were
mappings f(x), g(x) and h(x) then the following definition
suffice[Ref]
Definition 7. If there exist a vector x(t) which is an integral
curve of x˙ = f(x) which satisfies x(0) ∈ U a neighbourhood
in which h(x(t)) is defined for all t ≥ 0 and h(x(t)) for
all t ≥ 0 then the pair {f, h} is said to be observable by
implication limt←∞(x(t) = 0(x(t) = 0∀t ≥ 0)
The kernel of the mapping h(x) defines the set of all
x such that y = 0. If the gain of the system is restricted to a
particular space then ∀i, j, kij and k¯ij , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ r
and thus refining the static output feedback function in the
theorem[Ref]
Theorem 3. Can the restricted gain k = {kij} satisfying
kij ≤ kij < k¯ij such that A + BkC is stable given A ∈
Fn×mq , B ∈ Fn×nq , C ∈ F r×nq with rational number kij and
k¯ij with 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ r and n is the state and m is
the controls.
This theorem gives the principle on which the func-
tion is designed. if the gain k was restricted to parameters q
as the entries, the function can be further modified as thus, a
stable and controllable matrix belonging to a family of affine
transformations if A(q) = A0 +
∑l
i=1 qiAi were q ∈ F lq and
Ai ∈ Fn×nq , i ∈ {0, . . . , 1}
According to [21] the sufficient conditions of solvability are
given as follows that the pair {A,B} is stabilizable, if B has
full column rank and the pair {A,C} is observable and C
has a full row rank. For m ≤ p, the necessary conditions
of solvability depends on T (s) = ((sI − A)−1B which is
the transfer function of the system. If we employ the pole
placement problem [21] which seeks to determine the gain k
such that det(I+kT (λi)) = 0 were λi are eigenvalues and the
stable matrix in unit interval family problem[22], the partition
problem can be extended to a non invertible static output
feedback function from constraining the coefficient of the
gain k to lie in certain intervals in space. This transformation
involves expressing the gain k in terms of its coefficients
and consequently defining the matrices A,B,C sufficient
conditions for stability. Furthermore from the assumptions
stated earlier, a non singular matrix T exists which satisfies
the expression CsT−1 = [ Im&O]/ and it follows that
Acl = A + BKC is stabilizable were A = TAsT−1 and
B = TBs[23]. Before we use the approaches mentioned earlier
to transform the partition problem into an non invertible static
output feedback function. We define partition as follows
Definition 8. Does a vector x ∈ {−1,+1}p exists such that
aTx = 0 were ai = (a1, . . . , ap)T ∈ Z is an instance of the
partition problem.
Let aT = [ 0, . . . , 0, a1, . . . , ap, 0, . . . , 0] ∈ Zm be
the instance of the partition problem were it is padded in the
front with i − 1 zero vectors and padded in the back i + 1
zero vectors . Setting ap = −1, normalize t by dividing it by
xp to obtain p+ 1 variables a1, . . . , ap+1. Then we have
aT = [ 0, . . . , 0, a1, . . . ap+1, 0, . . . , 0] ∈ Zm (9)
We define the variable xT were the front is padded with i− 1
identity vectors and the back is padded with i+ 1 vectors
xT = [ 1, . . . , 1, x1, . . . , xp, 1, . . . , 1] ∈ Zm
then y = −x+ 1 and aTx = xTa = 0 which results to
aT y = yTa = 0 (10)
were x, y ∈ [ −1, 1] m. We now modify the matrix Acl which
determines stability
Acl(x, y) =
[
xT y
−K(Im + aT y) −K(Im + aTx)
]
(11)
decomposition becomes
Acl(x, y) =
(
xT −x+ 1
0 0
)
+
(
0 0
−K(Im + aT y) 0
)
+
(12)(
0 0
0 −K(Im + aTx)
)
Acl is stable if
(
0 0
−K(Im + aT y) 0
)
+(
0 0
0 −K(Im + aTx)
)
< K while(
xT −x+ 1
0 0
)(
0 0
−K(Im + aT y) 0
)
= 0
VI I . D ECOD I NG W I TH MARG I NAL S
Given an arbitrary number of symbols δ introduced
to the source symbols during transmission which generates a
successful decoding τsucc [14], this is analogous to the LLR
of the vertex representing the intermediate nodes whose LLR
Lνj→cj = 0 and its probability density function is a function
of the dirac delta function ∆j[24], the receiver overhead
can be expressed as a function of the finite number of the
output symbols ξ = δk . The complexity of decoding is a
function of τsucc and inversely proportional to each other.The
LPDC generator matrix G relates the source vector ~D to the
intermediate vector as C = G1.D were G1 ∈ F k×nqm while the
LT coder generator matrix relates the intermediate vector to
the output vector as E = G2.C.
We can see that the distribution is Guassian with mean
2SNR. Employing belief propagation which also known as
sum product approach[25], the number of output symbols k
is increased at each iteration in order to recover the original
information. A problem arises when the symbols from the
output vertex are exhausted, the transmission reaches to a
halt. In order to remedy the situation, a technique termed
inactivation decoding[26] is employed which deactivates the
remaining intermediate vertices from the selected decoding
graphs which have not been processed on the condition the
maximum vertex in the generator matrix with the highest
degree and the decoding of the output continues. An increase
in inactivation, leads to an increased received bits and a
performance in complexity. The received bits from the
inactivation is equivalent to deleting the intermediate vertex
from the bipartite graph. In order to reduce the receiver’s
overhead, the symbols received must be used to generate
linear systems whose generator matrix is full rank. A modified
version of the sum product algorithm termed edge deletion
decoding[27] deletes the edges and vertices of the inactivated
intermediate symbols to generate output vertices with a degree
of one and also the output vertices are are employed in the
decoding graph which require the degree distribution of the
vertex of the intermediate symbols from the unprocessed
decoding graph and some of the intermediate symbols. The
resulting output symbol degree distribution is given
[28].
Ωd(x) =
d∑
i=1
Ωd,ix
i =
d∑
i=1
(
d−1∑
αk=0
Ωφ+αk (13)(
φ+ αkαk
)
(1− d)φdαk)xi =
nΩ((1− d)x+ d)
were ψ is the set of random degrees αk. If the degree of the
output vertex is one, then the average degree of the vertex of
the source symbol goes to infinity.
Lemma 5. The probability that the codeword is decoded
correctly on the expectation of the BIAWGN channel, if the nth
central moment about the mean of the distribution is given by
µn =
x−µ
4µ .e
−(x−µ)2√
4µ dx
Proof. The expectation of the BIAWGN channel that defines
the distribution between the intermediate vertex and output
vertex is dependent on the expansion of the mean of the
distribution to its central of origin were the mean is given by
µn =
x−µ
4µ .e
−(x−µ)2√
4µ dx
E(BIAWGN)(σ)) =
1
2
√
piµ
∫ ∞
−∞
tanh(
L(cj)
2
)e
−(x−µ)2
4µ dx
(14)
For simplicity we take L(cj) = X , then we have
=
1
2
√
piµ
(∫ ∞
−∞
eX − e−X
eX + e−X
e
−(x−µ)2
4µ dx− (15)∫ ∞
−∞
e−X
eX + e−X
.e
−(x−µ)2
4µ dx
)
=
1
2
√
piµ
(∫ ∞
−∞
1
1 + e−2X
e
−(x−µ)2
4µ dx−∫ ∞
−∞
1
e2X + 1
.e
−(x−µ)2
4µ dx
)
=
√
4µ
∫ ∞
−∞
1
1 + e
−2(√4µ( x−µ√
4µ)
+µ
e
−(x−µ)2√
4µ dx+
√
4µ
∫ ∞
−∞
1
1 + e
−2(
√
4µ( x−µ√
4µ)
+µ
e
−(x−µ)2√
4µ dx
=
∫ +∞
−∞
ln(e
2
√
4µ( x−µ√
4µ
)+µ
+
x− µ
4µ
.e
−(x−µ)2√
4µ dx
taking the nth central moment about the mean of the
distribution
µn =
x− µ
4µ
.e
−(x−µ)2√
4µ dx (16)
then expanding the central moment to its centroid of origin[29],
we have
= Ein +
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(−1)n−jµ′jµn−j (17)
were Ein is the decoding error probability and
µ
′
j =
(
1− αn
)n−l
Lemma 6. Given the received intermediate bits from inac-
tivation, the probability of generating an output node from
inactivation is bounded by the discrete analog of the derivative
of the degree distribution ∀d ≥ 2.
Proof. Given the probability of generating an output node
from inactivation as follows
∑d
α=1
(
n
l
)(
α
n
)d(
1− αn
)n−l
xd
were
(
n
l
)
is the length of the code , in which n is the total
degree of the output vertex and l is the inital degree of the
output vertex and
(
α
n
)
is the received intermediate bits from
inactivation. This follows that
∀d ≥ 2 (18)
=
d∑
α=1
(l(l − 1) + l)
(
n
l
)(
α
n
)d(
1− α
n
)n−l
=
d∑
α=1
(l(l − 1))
(
n
l
)(
α
n
)d(
1− α
n
)n−l
+
d∑
α=1
l
(
n
l
)(
α
n
)d
(
1− α
n
)n−l
= n(n− 1)
(
α
n
)2 d∑
α=2
(
n− 2
l − 2
)(
α
n
)l−2(
1− α
n
)n−2−(n−l)
+
d∑
α=1
l
(
n
l
)(
α
n
)d(
1− α
n
)n−l
∀d ∈ {1, . . . , j} (19)
= n(n− 1)
(
α
n
)2 d−2∑
j=0
(
n− 2
j
)(
α
n
)j (
1− α
n
)n−2−j
+
d∑
α=1
l
(
n
l
)(
n
l
)(
1− α
n
)n−l
= n(n− 1)
(
α
n
)2
+
d∑
α=1
l
(
n
l
)(
α
n
)d(
1− α
n
)n−l
+
d∑
α=1
l
(
n
l
)(
α
n
)d(
1− α
n
)n−l((
n− 1
)
α
n
+ 1
)
=
d∑
α=1
l
(
n
l
)(
α
n
)d(
1− α
n
)n−l((
n− 1
)
α
n
+ 1
)
( d∑
α=1
l
(
n
l
)(
α
n
)d
−
(
α
n
)
+1
)
= ∆kαd
were ∆kαd is the discrete analog.
The LLR of the channel as the message moves from
the vertex νLPDC precoded from the LPDC coder to the
vertex representing the LT codes νLT at iteration i is given as
Lνj→cj = 2tanh
−1
(
tanh
(
L(c
(i)
j
2
)
(20)
∏
ν
′
LDPC 6=ν
′
LDPC
tanh
(
L(c
(i−1)
j
2
))
the LLR message of the first term can be expanded thus in
relation to the mean of the message[30]
E
[
tanh
(
L(c
(i)
j
2
)]
=
∫∞
−∞ tanh
u
2 e
− (u−µ)24µ du√
4piµ
(21)
The LLR of the channel as the message moves from the
vertex of the LT coder νLT to the vertex of the LPDC coder
νLDPC at iteration i is given as [30]
Lcj→νj = L(νi) +
∑
νLT 6=ν′LT
Lνj→cj (22)
were L(cj)(i) and L(cj)(i−1) are mutually and statistically
independent. The mean of the message at ith iteration of the
Belief propagation is given as [14]
µ(i+1) = α
d∑
i=1
ωdLνj→cj (µ
(i)) (23)
In sum product algorithm, to approach Shannon capacity
in binary erasure channels and converge the decoding error
probability to zero, then limk→∞ Ω(x) = 0 which means the
decoded block length must approach infinity.
Density Evolution is applied to the intermediate and outer
symbol vertices in the decoding graph to asymptotically the
density of messages as it moves from the edge distribution
to the vertex distribution to determine the bound on the
SNR. The BER is related to the code rate by the expression
[24], BER = 10 log10(
1
2σ2 ).
1
R and the output vertices are
selected uniformly at random. In order to observe marginals
Pr(X = x), the statistical distance between the precode
output vertex distribution and the marginal distribution should
be minimized. In other words,∑
i=1
Ωix
i−1 =
1
zi
∑
tiΩ
′
(x) (24)
were ti is a variable in the marginal distribution and Ω
′
(x) in
the partial belief state of the precode output vertex.
We define the following distributions as follows
Π(x) =
∑
i Πix
i; the intermediate vertex degree distribution
ω(x) =
∑
i=1 ωix
i−1; output edge degree distribution
λ(x) =
∑
i=1 λix
i−1; precode intermediate
nodes/intermediate edge degree distribution
Ω(x) =
∑
i=1 Ωix
i−1; precode output vertex distribution We
relate the distributions as follows [13]
ωi =
iΩi∑k
j=1 jΩj
λi =
iΠi∑n
j=1 jΠj
(25)
The Binominal distribution of the LT encoding is given as
Π1 =
(
n
i
)(
Ω
′
(1)
k′
)i(
1− Ω
′
k′
)n−i
(26)
After each iteration, the LLR of the message converges with
the distribution of the LT edges that is LνjLT → cjLT =∑
i=1 Ωix
i−1 in the decoding graph, this ensures accurate
decoding of the message and also BER ≤ LνjLT→cjLT . The
whole essence of this design is to mitigate the scenario were
the recorded bits are not enough to decode the message due to
inactivation. The generating polynomial describes the structure
of the raptor code while the rate and degree distribution
determine performance of the LPDC code.
By employing Assumed density filtering[25] we can give an
update rule on the message of the vertex of the LPDC coder
as follows
LνjLT =
k∑
i=1
Ω
′
i
Ω
′
i + 1
+ z[
∑
d
‖1− LcjLT ‖(LνjLT )(i−1)]
(27)
LνjLPDC =
k∑
i=1
λ
′
i
d(λ
′
j + 1)
2
+
z[
∑
d
‖1− LcjLPDC‖(LνjLT )(i−1)]
were z is the E[tanh(
L(c
(i)
j )
2 )]
1) Finite Design
Consider an edge e of the coordinate i of a subgraph and
LLR of the channel message as it moves from the vertex of
the LDPC coder to the LT coder at iteration t; L(i,t)cj→νj , an
edge e at the origin of the subgraph and its LLR at iteration
t+ 1;L(t+1)cj→νj and an edge e at coordinate i and coordinate j
and its LLR of the channel message at iteration t as L(i,j,t)cj→νj .
We can relate the LLR as follows [31]
L(i,t)cj→νj =
1
2
(1−
d−1∏
j=1
(1− 2L(i,j,t)cj→νj ) (28)
L(t+1)cj→νj = G(Lc1→ν1 , . . . , Lcj→νj )
were G =
∏n
i=1 ν
(t)
j∏n
i=1 νj+
∏n
i=1(1−νj) is the parent tree. For a
subgraph with depth 2, the path along the edges for the
vertex cj of the LT code moving in a cyclic manner and
terminating at the originating vertex cj , the girth is given
by 2(2) + 2 = 6, a trellis of t ≥ 2k can locate vertex cj
if and only if 2k ≤ 10 that is if the girth increases beyond
10. By employing a function that maps the shaping matrix
A to the galois fild of q elements, the parent tree can be
coloured through L(t+1)cj→νj . The function is defined thus
Γk : A → GF (q)(1 ≤ k ≤ d) and the colouring is defined
thus ej ∈ E → Γk(ν(t)j ) 6= Γ(νtj)∀j, s, k(O ≤ j, s ≤ m − 1)
and the width of the path the edge follows $T (p) is expressed
using a function [32]
$T (p) =
$L
‖$‖ .
1
degG.Np
.
∏
q∈Prefix
1
deg(q)− 1 (29)
were L = d |P |2 e is the radius of the path. We can find the
bound on the number of vertices that have degree 0 assuming
the subgraph is a null set. Let the absolute value of the eigen
values of the parent tree be ∆ = |λ1| ≥ |λ2| ≥, . . . ,≥ |λd|
and let the lower bound on the eigen values be ≤ 2√∆− 1,
then we have [33]
Nd=0 ≤ 4(∆− 1)(1− b)n
b∆2
≤ 4n
b∆
(30)
At the ith coordinate of n dimensional lattice, the coding gain
can be related to the parent tree in the assumption that the
subgraph can be projected to the subspace [34] which implies
that
φ$TP ∈F (Λ)
A$TP
= [
√
γ(Λ)γ(Λ)] (31)
This implies that the mapping that characterizes the weight
function of the path of the edges is a function of the
coding gain and the area of the lattice plane(resp. Babai
nearest plane). We can show that the optimal weight
coefficients of the code is equivalent to the capacity of the
channel. By simplicity, we denote the signal-to-noise ratio by
SNR. We define the optimal weight coefficients[35] as follows
wi−1 =
√
(1 + SNRo)i
SNRo
SNR
(32)
Squaring both sides, (26) becomes
w∗2i−1 = (1 + SNRo)
2iSNRo
SNR
(33)
= (1 + SNRo)(1 + SNRo)
SNRo
SNR
= (1 + SNRo + SNRo + S
2
NRo)
SNRo
SNR
= (1 + 2SNRo + S
2
NRo)
SNRo
SNR
= (1 + µo + S
2
NRo)
SNRo
SNR
Let the signal-to-noise ratio be a function of an ideal[14] as
follows SNRo = info(I ∩ (µo2α )). Therefore we have,
w∗2i−1 = (1 + µo + S
2
NRo)info(I ∩ (
µo
2α
)) (34)
From lemma, the bound by fraction of output bits of degree 2
is given Ω2 ≥ β2αµ . then
w∗2i−1 = (1 + µo + S
2
NRo)info(I ∩ Ωi) (35)
Lemma 7. For arbitrary integer η ∈ R and as n → ∞, the
degree is scaled by a factor 1 + 1.08n
Proof. For a constant expressed as δ =
∑∞
n=3(dn −
1
n )∀n, dn = deg(νn) we have
∑
δn = log x+ (γ + δ − 32 ) +
O( 1x ). We can see that for values of n ≤ m were m ∈ [ 0, 1]
we have η ∈
[
(m−1)(m+1)
(m−2) , 1
]
which means that for an
edge e of the parent tree, wn = dn = be(n − 2)! − ηnc were
en =
∑n
k=0
1
gn
were gn is the girth of the vertex ν. Given
that
∑∞
k=1
∏k
j=1
1
n+j <
1
n!
∑∞
k=1
1
(n+k)k
and for a depth of
2 of the subgraph, this reduces to
∑∞
k=1
∏
1
n+2 < dn <
1
n−2 . From theorem[36]
(
n
e
)n−1√
2pi
n (1 +
1.08
n ) < wn <(
n
e
)n−1√
2pi
n (1 +
1.28
n ) since n → ∞, the width path will
converge to the degree.
Theorem 4. For a degree 1 of the intermediate bits, the bound
in the polynomial is equivalent to its block length k as k →∞
Proof. We have that η(µo+ε)4l ln(2) >
ϕ−1(xj)
4 ln(2) ∀j = 1, . . . , N
which implies that η(µ + ε) > ϕ−1(xj) were
ϕ−1 = E[ tanh(
L(ν
(i)
j )
2 )] . As i → ∞, we have the
binominal expansion of the polynomial as follows
Ωi =
2
i(i−1)
2
i!
= 1 + i+
2
2!
i2 +
8
3!
i3 +
64
4!
i4+, . . .) (36)
∀x ∈ (0, R+ σ),
Ωi ≤ 1
(1 + ε)(i(i− 1)) (37)
then (30) becomes
∑
Ωi =
∞∑
i=k
[
2i(i+ 1)
i(i+ 1)(i+ 2)
] (38)
= i(i+ 1)
∞∑
i=k
[
1
k
− 2
k + 1
+
1
k + 2
]
=
i(i+ 1)
k(k + 1)
Therefore for degree 1, k(k+1) = (1+ε) which is equivalent
to k(k + 1) ≤ η−1ϕ−1(xj)4 ln(2)
VI I I . BOUNDARY M EA SUREMENT
The boundary measurements are designed as a con-
catenation of vertex set in a planar bipartite graph to edge
weights constructed as a set of vertices in a cell in the
Grassmannian graph. Given the index set If ⊂ I , removing an
element from the set, an embedding can be constructed from
the bipartite to the Grassmannian as Grk,n(R) → RP
(
n
k
)−1
from guage transformations expressed as a function of matroids
Meas : R>0 → Grk,n(R) were Grk,n(R) is k planes on
an n-dimensional space which is not affected by the ratios
of k × k minors of a k × n mapping code.[Ref]. To dissect
this Grassmann, an arbitary edge function is selected such
that e : u → v and if the vertex is coloured, another edge
function is selected e
′
: v → w by maximum revolution,
anticlockwise or clockwise depending on the colouring. This
maximum revolution induces self intersections through the
path and can define the boundary measurement as Mij =∑
P :e→e′ (−1)wind(R)wt(P, y) were the factor (−1)wind(R) is
bound by the number of connection between sources to the
planar bipartitte graph which is made up of n external nodes
of perfect orientation and k sources of perfect orientation.
Example 1. We will use the planar bipartite graph structure
with perfect orientation[37],[38] to buttress our idea. This
is shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. First, we convert the planar
bipartite graph into non planar bipartite graph taking note
of the sources and external nodes while labelling them
accordingly for convenience purposes. If the row and column
are of the same node, the map code entry is set to 1,if there
is no path connecting the nodes, the map entry is set to 0.
Finally we modify the condition in literature to support our
idea by stating that if there is a negative sign then the entry is
set to 0 and set to 1 if otherwise. With the explained points we
can construct the boundary measurement mapping A and B
to Gr>0(2, 4) and Gr>0(2, 6) respectively using the flows as
regards to whether it is clockwise or anticlockwise as follows;
Fig. 2. Non planar bipartite graph with perfect orientation containing 2
boundary vertices, 2 external nodes and a face converted to its non planar
structure
Fig. 3. Non planar bipartite graph with perfect orientation containing 2
boundary vertices, 6 external nodes and 9 faces converted to its non planar
structure
A =
[
1 0 −t+ x −(y + xzt)
0 1 y zt
]
=
[
1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1
]
→ Gr>0(2, 4)
(39)
The same idea is extended to B as well
B =
[
1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1
]
→ Gr>0(2, 6)
(40)
The dimension of the Grassmanian parametrized from
Gr>0(2, 4) is given as 4, then the number of boundary
verticesk is computed as follows k(n − k) = 4; k = 2 while
that of the Grassmannian parametrized Gr>0(2, 4) is given
as 6, then the number of boundary verticesk is computed as
follows k(n− k) = 6; k = 2
For an index set I = {1, 2} and a minor J = 2, 6,
we can compute the plucker coordinate for ∆2,6 as follows
∆26 = f/g =
(1b+ C2)(1b+ ab)
1 + C2
(41)
For more details on plucker coordinates, readers are referred
to [38]
Lemma 8. The degree of the vertices of the resultant graph
from the map code designed from the boundary measurement
is equivalent to the dimension of the product of the support E
and F such that r ≤ 2q[ n
k
] q
Proof. for k subspaces E,F of Fqm , d(E,F ) =
k − dim(E ∩ F ) and for vector spaces over the same
field, we have dim(F ∩G) = dim(F )+dim(G)−dim(F.G),
therefore we have
d(E,F ) = k − (dim(E) + dim(F ) − dim(E.F ) ≤
k − (k + k − (k − r) = r. Given a subspace with dimension
k, [
n
k
] q =
∏k−1
i=0
qn−qi
qk−qi , this follows that
k−1∏
i=0
qn − qi
qk − qi +
k−1∏
i=0
qn − qi
qk − qi = r (42)
k−1∏
i=0
qn−i+1 − q
qi − 1 +
k−1∏
i=0
qn−i+1 − q
qi − 1
k−1∏
i=0
q
qn−i+1 − 1
qi − 1 +
k−1∏
i=0
q
qn−i+1 − 1
qi − 1
lim
q→1
2[
n
k
] = r
Theorem 5. The basis of the product of the subspace E and F
induces a subgraph with no cycle whose weight of its total path
is equivalent to the plucker coordinate of the Grassmannian
graph.
Proof. Given a bounded permutation fx(i) = min{y ≥
i/vi ∈ span{vi+1, vi+2, . . . vj}} were vi are the columns
of the support of S, taking basis {vi+1, vi+2, . . . vj}} and
extend it to E∩F as follows vi+1, vi+2, . . . , vj , ei−m+1, . . . , ei
and {vi+1, . . . , vj , fi−m+1, . . . , fk} through the path of
the disk divided by a face f ∈ F then we have
P = {ei−m+1, fi−m+1, . . . , ei, fi} which forms a ba-
sis. The plucker coordinate now becomes ∆I(G) =∑∏
Pi
weight(Pi), which implies that∆I(G) divides the ver-
tex set ∆I indexed by I an identity matrix such that each
elements e ∈ E and f ∈ F induces a subgraph in ∆I
From the above result connecting k to k + 1 with a
rank r will give the boundary measurement from the planar
bipartite graph G to Grassmannian Gr as k + 1 ∈ I but for
k 6∈ I with plucker coordinates gives as ∆I(G) = ∆I(Gr) +
r∆I −{k+ 1} ∪ {k}(Gr) which follows that ∆(I {r})∪{k} =
(−1)tbrk ≥ 0 were t = |I ∩ [ r+ 1, k−1] | which follows that
(−1)i
i∏
j=1
qj−1qm− i+ 1− 1
qi − 1 = (−1)
iqi(i−1)/2[
m
i
] (43)
that implies that the intersection array brk ≤ qi(i−1)/2[ nk] q
IX . D ECOD I NG W I TH COPULA
An approach that approximates the conditional distri-
bution which is the kernel function by estimating the codeword
that maximizes the probability of correcting codewords of a
low rank weight through an exhaustive search procedure in the
Grassmannian space is proposed which maximizes an objective
function and adapts [39] to raptor codes in the rank metric
[39]. Due to the search procedure degree of the distribution,
the kernel is a function of the conditional distribution, if
the received codeword y with respect to the encoded word.
By decomposing the codeword, the upper triangular structure
contains the information that enables the location of message
of low rank weight while the orthonormal structure determines
the location of the codeword. With an arbitrary reference point
in mind the distance between the codeword that maximizes
the conditional distribution is calculated. The probability of
avoiding decoding failure is if the low rank codeword is within
a bound Qˆi − Qˆj were Qˆi and Qˆj as threshold values. By
employing Cauchy schwarz inequality, the probability that the
low rank codeword is within the subspace can be computed
as follows
For a set of codewords {Xi}i=1 generated by h0 = EˆS− 12ωo,
we have
||ωl − xl|| = ||ωl − EˆS− 12ωl|| ≤ (44)
||(I − EˆS− 12 ||||ωl|| ≤
max{|1− Eˆ
Qˆi
|, |1− Eˆ
Qˆj
}
The codeword that maximizes the probability of
avoiding decoding error can be found by solving the optimiza-
tion problem
xˆ = arg min Tr(−1
2
yTxxT y + ||pi||2) (45)
were pi = H(H
′
S−1NRH)y is the projection onto the column
space of yT
Theorem 6. Given the decomposition of the received codeword
y = QyR, then the correlation R is given by (XλXT + µrI)
if I(X,R) = 0 and I(H,Qy) = 0,
Proof.
R = X[µI + λ]−1 − Gˆ(λ)−1XT + λ)− 12 (46)
= XµrI +
Xλ
Gλ
−
√
XT + λ =
[XµI +X(G)−1 −XT ] + λ = ϕ+ λ.
Were Gˆ is the orthonormal bases for R while λ is signal
eigenvalue and ϕ is the projection.
The projection onto column space defines a sphere
that encompasses the field of interest with a radius in which
most often is the Euclidean distance and can also be generalized
to be the rank between the reference and the estimate that
maximizes the distribution which can correct up to µ − 1
errors were µ is the radius. The decoding failure occurs if the
radius is large which results in candidate codewords that would
make finding the estimate complex leading to computational
overhead.
A. Copula
Given a codeword X = (x1, . . . , xn, copula
function is defined on a unit hypercube of uniform
distribution [ 0, 1] as a cascade of cumulative distribution
function. If a transformation U = (u1, . . . , un) were
U1 = F1(X1), . . . , Un = Fn(Xn) which models the
dependencies of the codewords which are linearly dependent.
In other words according to skyla[40], F (x1, . . . , xn) =
C(u1, . . . , un) = P [ U1 ≤ u1, . . . , Un ≤ un] were the
transformation U is sampled from a uniform distribution
and Fn(xn) is marginal cumulative distribution function and
P [ U1 ≤ u1, . . . , Un ≤ un] defines the dependence as follows
λu = limP (U1 ≤ u1, . . . , Un ≤ un) = (47)
lim
1− 2u+ C(u1, . . . , un)
1− u
. were the tail dependence coefficient is uniformly distributed
and if λu = 0, then the component are independent. By
taking the partial derivatives of the marginal cumulative
distribution functions as a function of the elements of the
transformation will result in the product of the copula density
and the marginal pdf of the codeword as follows
∂F (x1, . . . , xn)
∂(u1, . . . , un)
= (48)
∂nC(x1, . . . , xn)
∂(u1, . . . , un)
×
n∏
i=1
fi(xi)
We define families of copulas based on the underlying
distribution vis a vis standard multivariate normal distribution
defined by a correlation matrix RG denoted as follows
C(φRG(x1), . . . , φRG(xn)) given by
C(φ(x1), . . . , φ(xn)) =
1
(2pi)
n
2
√
|Σ| exp(
−xT x
2Σ ))∏n
i=1
1√
2pi
exp(−x2i2 )
= (49)
1√|Σ| exp(−12xT (R−1 − I)x)
Given 2 distributions, the divergence can be modelled using
KLD [41]
KLD(f(x;φ1)||g(x;φ2)) =
d∑
i=1
KLD(fi(xi;φi,1)||gi(xi;φi,2))+
(50)
0.5(Trace(Σ−12 Σ1 + log
|Σ2|
|Σ1| − d)
The properties of copula are defined as follows; if there exists
k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that the component of the transformation
at the kth position is equal to zero then C(u) = 0, for all
component of the transformation sampled from a uniform dis-
tribution. Also if all the components of the transformation are
approximated as unity except the kth position then C(u) = uk
and finally if each component of the transformation in the
kth position is increasing, then C(u) increases by an equal
amount We can relate the copulas to the degree distribution of
the boundary measurement map as follows [42]
f(x/Gi) =
n∏
i=1
fi(xi)×
∏
i,j∈E
Ci,j(Ui, Uj) (51)
To compute the marginal, we utilize ’a priori’ which gives the
weight of the boundary measurement map which is actually
a product of all the weights of the edges. Furthermore, the
maximum-likelihood syndrome decoding problem, the variable
nodes represent the Low rank parity check codewords X =
(x1, . . . , xn) and the check nodes represents the conditional
posterior distribution of the marginal of the raptor codeword
in the rank metric as fx/y(x1, . . . , xn) =
∏m
i=1 fyi/x ×∏n
i=1 fxi/xi were Hij 6= 0,∀E = 0 and
∏n
i=1 fxi/xi is the
independent realization.
B. Detection
The conditional distribution proposed earlier would
be utilized as a smoothing function analogous to a Kalman
filter to recover the message.
ζ(x(k) = Ey/x,xˆ lnf(x; xˆ, P (y/x) = −n
2
ln|xˆ|{Tr[R−1G − I]+
(52)
P (y)
∫
expTrace
(− 12yTx(SNRI − vx(1− pi))y)−1
− 12yT y + 12yTxxT y + ||pi||2
dpi(x)}
and update on the kth position is given by
xˆ(k+1) = x(k) + ∆k(
∫
f(x; xˆ)dpi(x) (53)
Each update in the iteration process leads to a better ap-
proximation of the candidate codeword, if the corresponding
message is proportional to the conditional probability defined.
If xˆk+1 ≥ xk+1 the coupla monotically and finally reaches a
point of convergence to its global maxima.
Theorem 7. The bounds of the copula cdfs are given by
T (u, v) = max(0,
√
ln(1− u1n)ln(u2n)) and T (u, v) =
min(0,
√
ln(u1n)ln(1− u2n)) were u, v are coordinates of the
vertices of the boundary measurement map.
Proof.∫ ∞
0
C1(1− u1n)(1− u2n)du1
∫ ∞
0
C2(1− u1n)u2ndu2+
(54)∫ ∞
0
C3u1n(1− u2n)du1
∫ ∞
0
C4(u1n)(u2n)du2
taking partial derivatives and sampling the couplas from a
uniform distribution parametrized by the coordinates
u1n[
∂C3(u1n)
∂u
− ∂C1(u2n)
∂u
] du1+ (55)
u2n[
∂C2(u1n)
∂u
− ∂C1(u2n)
∂u
] du2+
u1nu2n[
∂C1(u1n)
∂u
+
∂C4(u2n)
∂u
] − ∂C2(u1n)
∂u
−
∂C3(u2n)
∂u
du1du2
taking limits
limdu→0
[u1n − C1(u1n, u2n)[1− C2(1− u1n)− C2(u2n)]
1− u +
(56)
[1− C3(u1n)− C3(1− u2)][u2n − C4(u1n, u2n)]
1− u
using symmetry, we now have∫ ∞
u1n
fs(s/t)− (57)
2u1n exp(u
2
2n)[1−
1
(1− ρ2 )I[
2ρ
1− ρ2
√
ln(1− u1n)ln(u2n)]+
[1− 1
(1− ρ2 )I[
2ρ
1− ρ2
√
ln(u1n)ln(1− u2n)
∫ ∞
u2n
fs(s/t)−
2u1n exp(u
2
2n)
were the marginal fs(s/t) =∑∞
k=0
1√
2piσ
exp[ − s−λ2σ2 ] exp (−λi)λ
k
i
k [43]
X . S I MULAT I ON
We carry out a comparison between the decoding
primitives applied in the decryption method employed in code-
based post quantum cryptography using the Bit Error rate
performance with 10000 Monte Carlo iterations. We also
used a small parity check matrix of size 32 and dimension
64. The Constellation size which is the distance between the
reference codeword and the codewords that would optimize
the conditional probability distribution based on the received
codeword x, M was increased from 5 to 20. We can see that
increasing the size improves the error correction capability and
consequently a reduction in the decoding failure rate and if
we reduce the size below M = 5, then there is probability
of decoding failure. From the results we can also see that
Decoding with Marginals[44] has a better performance than
our proposed copula based Maximum likelihood approach.
However, our approach improves slightly than the Index set
approach.This also means that inference using the Marginal
method converges to a solution faster than our proposed method
while our approach infers better than the index set method.
Fig. 4. BER performance of decoding schemes with constellation size M=5
Fig. 5. BER performance of decoding schemes with constellation size M=10
XI . PARAMETER S E L ECT I ON
Quantum security is obtained by dividing the security
bits by 2, that means for 128 bit security the equivalent
quantum security is 56 bits and to make the density of the
decodable syndrome close to 1, parameters must satisfy[45].
The rank weight of the Trapdoor function should be large
enough to make cryptanalysis through a structural process
difficult. The data size and computational time are linear in
logq while the complexity of combinatorics are polynomial on
q making it difficult to break encryption key. The decoding
error with failure probability is equivalent 1
ql
′−2wr+1 [46] and
the key size increase inversely to an increase in the probability
of the decoding failure. In the presence of cyclic vectors,
classical attacks makes it possible to obtain the support of
the coordinates of the Augmented codes. In Table 2 we give
suggested parameters were n is the code length, k is the code
Fig. 6. BER performance of decoding schemes with constellation size M=15
Fig. 7. BER performance of decoding schemes with constellation size M=20
dimension,m is the degree of extension field, q is the prime, w
is the error weight and r is the rank weight which is compared
to other parameters from related works
TABLE II
PARAMETER S
n k m q w r key Security
67 7 89 2 5 6 5963 128 [47]
101 5 113 2 6 8 11,413 128 [47]
94 47 47 2 5 5 2,397 128 [7]
100 80 96 2 5 16 4,239,360 192 [46]
100 80 96 2 5 16 4,497,408 192 [9]
67 22 71 2 11 22 1,368,000 133 [48]
110 7 18 2 12 7 74.6554 128 This work
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